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Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994 – April 2020
Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley
April 15, 2020
We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission since 1994. This revised listing includes 66 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through April 2020. It includes challenges
and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency concerns. This listing can be treated as an Appendix to
Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners,
4 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016).

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

2020

United States v.
United
Technologies
Corp. and
Raytheon1

United Technologies Corporation (UTC) and
Raytheon proposed to merge. UTC is an
aerospace company that produces engines and
aircraft subsystems and components.
Raytheon is a defense company whose core
business includes missiles and air defense
systems. The DOJ alleged that the merger
would eliminate direct competition between
the parties for several products supplied to the
U.S. government, including military airborne
radios and military GPS.

Input foreclosure

Proposed final judgment required
parties to divest Raytheon’s
military airborne radios business
and UTC’s military GPS business.
It also requires divestiture of
UTC’s optical systems business.

The DOJ also alleged that the vertical
integration of the companies, which both
provide critical inputs for reconnaissance
satellites, would lessen competition in large
space-based optical systems and EO/IR
reconnaissance satellite payloads. Raytheon is
one of several builders of a satellite system
called a EO/IR satellite payload, and has a
dominant position in its component part, a
focal plane array (FPA). UTC is one of only
two companies that build optical systems for
these payloads. The combined company could
refuse to supply other payload builders with
FPAs, or supply them at a higher cost if the
payload builders did not also buy UTC’s
optical system. Additionally, the combined
company could harm Raytheon’s payload
builder rivals by raising the prices for UTC’s
2
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Input foreclosure;
Elimination of
potential sponsor of
entry

The state attorneys general
requested a permanent injunction
of T-Mobile from acquiring
Sprint. Following a loss at trial,
the court approved the merger
without any further restrictions.

optical systems, or denying them access
altogether.
2019

State of New
York, et al., v.
Deutsche
Telekom AG, et
al.2

T-Mobile, the third-largest U.S. wireless
carrier, proposed to merge with Sprint, the
fourth-largest wireless carrier. The merger was
challenged by a group of state attorneys
general. Though the anticompetitive concerns
were mostly horizontal, the States also alleged
that the merger would have vertical effects
through reducing competition in the
downstream sale of network access to Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs).
MVNOs do not have their own networks, but
buy wholesale access from a mobile network
operator and resell it to retail customers. The
merger would allegedly reduce the options
available to MVNOs, decrease the leverage
they have in negotiating with wireless carriers,
and ultimately increase the prices that their
subscribers pay. Additionally, the States
claimed that the merged firm would have less
incentive to provide access to services
facilitating the entry of potential competitors
such as cable companies.

United States v. Sabre, a global distribution system (GDS) and
Sabre Corp. et dominant provider of airline booking services
al.3
in the United States, proposed to acquire
Farelogix, an innovative disrupter.
Historically, airlines have relied on legacy
3

The DOJ Final Judgment and FCC
Order had required the merging
parties to provide various
remedies, including the divestiture
of a prepaid brand to DISH and a
transitional MVNO agreement
with DISH.

Input foreclosure

The DOJ requested a permanent
injunction of Sabre from acquiring
Farelogix. Following a loss at trial,
the court’s final judgment
approved the merger without any

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

booking services provided by Sabre and two
other GDS. Farelogix offers an alternative
booking service that allows airlines to bypass
GDSs and connect directly to travel agencies.
Its New Distribution Capability (NDC)
technology also allows airlines to offer a
broader and more personalized range of
options to travelers booking through these
agencies.

Remedy
restrictions.
The UK Competition and Markets
Authority issued an order
prohibiting the deal; whether
Sabre appeals that decision to the
Competition Appeals Tribunal is
pending.

DOJ alleged that the acquisition would
eliminate head-to-head competition between
the two firms in booking services.
Additionally, the DOJ alleged that, even when
Farelogix’s technology was used in
conjunction with a GDS, it reduced the
complexity of the service that the GDS had to
provide, increasing airline leverage in
bargaining with the GDS. In particular,
Farelogix would provide booking services and
airlines would construct initial offers
themselves, leaving the GDS only to
aggregate offers from multiple airlines.
In re
UnitedHealth
Group/DaVita4

UnitedHealth Group proposed to acquire
Input foreclosure
DaVita Medical (DMG) for $4.3 billion. In the
Las Vegas Area, UnitedHealth Group’s
subsidiary Optum and DMG operated the two
largest managed care provider organizations
(MCPOs), OptumCare and HCPNV
respectively, which are medical groups that
4

Consent order required
UnitedHealth Group to divest
DMG’s HCPNV to Intermountain
Healthcare.

Year

Case
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Consent order required Staples to
(1) firewall Essendant reseller
commercially sensitive
information and (2) not, without
providing prior written notification
to the Commission, acquire any
business engaged in selling office
products

employ or affiliate with a significant number
of primary care physicians and specialists to
ensure the coordination of patient care. The
products at issue were (1) MCPOs sold to
Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs)
and (2) Medicare Advantage (MA) plans sold
to individual MA members. The FTC alleged
that in addition to horizontal effects in the
MCPO market, the proposed acquisition
would cause vertical anticompetitive effects
from the integration of UnitedHealth Group
and HCPNV because “UnitedHealth Group—
which owns United, the leading MAO in the
Las Vegas Area—would control a
competitively significant input—HCPNV—
for United’s rival MAOs’ networks.”
UnitedHealth Group would have “the ability
and incentive to negotiate with United’s rival
MAOs for higher HCPNV rates, or even
refuse to allow rival MAOs to contract with
HCPNV.”
In re Sycamore
Partners II,
L.P., Staples,
Inc. and
Essendant Inc.5

Staples proposed to acquire Essendant, the
largest wholesale distributor of office products
in the United States, selling exclusively to
resellers. Most of these resellers compete with
Staples to sell office products and related
services to midmarket business-to-business
customers. The FTC alleged that the
acquisition would allow Staples to have access
to Essendant’s reseller customers’
5
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Collusive
information
exchanges

The FTC Order required that each
respondent not acquire or own
more than one-third equity interest
in Corpus Christi assets or more
than one third of the PET/PTA
Production. It also ordered that
respondents not share confidential
information.

commercially sensitive business information,
which could allow Staples to offer higher
prices than it otherwise would when bidding
against a reseller for an end customer’s
business. It also alleged that “Sycamore’s and
Staples’ access to this commercially sensitive
information may substantially lessen
competition in the market for the sale and
distribution of office products to midmarket
business-to-business customers by eliminating
direct and substantial competition between
Respondents Staples’ and Essendant’s reseller
customers which may result in higher prices to
end customers.”
2018

In re Corpus
Christi
Polymers LLC,
et al.6

Corpus Christi Polymers (CCP), a joint
venture formed by subsidiaries of Alfa S.A.B.
de C.V. (DAK), Indorama, and Far Eastern
New Century Corporation (FENC), proposed
to acquire a polyethylene terephthalate resin
(PET) and purified terephthalic acid (PTA)
production facility from M&G Resins. PET is
a plastic polymer used for packaging
consumer goods. PTA is the primary input for
PET.
DAK, Indorama, and FENC are three of only
four North American PET producers,
controlling 90% of PET capacity. The plant
would be the largest PET plant in North
America. DAK and Indorama are two of only
6
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Input foreclosure

The district court ordered JeldWen to divest the Towanda
facility. Jeld-Wen’s appeal is
currently pending.

three North American PTA producers.
The FTC alleged that the acquisition
facilitated coordination among respondents
and increased the likelihood that they would
exercise market power in the PET market.
Additionally, it alleged that “CCP lack[ed]
adequate safeguards to prevent DAK,
Indorama, and FENC from using the
relationships occasioned by their joint
ownership of CCP, and by CCP’s acquisition
of the Corpus Christi Assets, to transmit
competitively sensitive information beyond
the minimum degree reasonably necessary to
accomplish CCP’s legitimate purposes.”
Steves and
Sons, Inc. v.
Jeld-Wen, Inc.7

Steves and Sons, Inc. (Steves) and Jeld-Wen
both sell interior molded doors. Jeld-Wen was
also one of three vertically integrated
manufacturers that makes doorskins, the
largest input for finished doors. In 2012,
Steves and Jeld-Wen entered into a long-term
supply agreement. Shortly after, Jeld-Wen
acquired Craftmaster International (CMI), one
of the other vertically integrated
manufacturers.
In 2016, Steves brought an private antitrust
action alleging that the merger substantially
lessened competition in the doorskins market.
It alleged that Jeld-Wen overcharged it for
7
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Case
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

doorskins in the years following the
acquisition, and Steves was unable to find a
comparable alternate supplier. A jury returned
a verdict in favor of Steves and awarded it
antitrust damages.
Subsequently, Steves requested equitable
relief in the form of the divestiture of
Towanda, a doorskin manufacturing facility
that Jeld-Wen had acquired through the CMI
acquisition. The DOJ submitted a Statement of
Interest supporting divestiture, describing it as
“the best way to preserve and restore
competition in the relevant market threatened
by, or already harmed by, an anticompetitive
merger.”
United States v.
United
Technologies
Corp. and
Rockwell
Collins, Inc.8

United Technologies Corp. (UTC) proposed to Input foreclosure
acquire Rockwell Collins, Inc. UTC and
Rockwell Collins produce aerospace products,
including pneumatic ice protection systems
and trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuators
(THSAs) for large aircraft. UTC and Rockwell
Collins were two of three firms that produced
pneumatic ice protection systems and
provided aftermarket systems and parts. In
addition to reducing horizontal competition
between the parties for these two products, the
DOJ alleged that the acquisition would
substantially lessen competition by reducing
the merged firm’s incentive to provide parts to
8

Final Judgment required
defendants to divest Rockwell
Collins’ business in pneumatic ice
protection systems and other ice
protection products, and its THSA
business.

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

aftermarket customers.
United States
v. CRH plc9

CRH proposed to acquire the Pounding Mill
Quarry Corporation. Together, CRH and
Pounding Mill owned nearly all the
aggregates quarries suitable for highway
construction in West Virginia. In addition,
CRH was one of only two suppliers of asphalt
concrete, to which aggregates are an input, in
West Virginia. The other producer of asphalt
concrete sourced its aggregates from
Pounding Mill. The DOJ alleged that the
merger would give CRH the incentive to raise
the price of or deny access to aggregates for
that asphalt concrete competitor.

Input foreclosure

Consent Decree required CRH to
divest one of Pounding Mill’s
quarries.

In re Northrop
Grumman
Corporation10

Northrop Grumman proposed to acquire
Orbital ATK. Northrop Grumman was one of
four competitors capable of supplying the US
government with missile systems. Orbital ATK
was the premier supplier or solid rocket
motors, which are a component of missile
systems. The FTC alleged that the merger
would have given Northrop Grumman the
incentive to raise the price of or deny access to
Orbital’s solid rock motors to other missile
system competitors.

Input foreclosure

Consent Decree required Northrop
Grumman to separate its solid
rocket motor business from the rest
of the company with a firewall and
for the Department of Defense to
appoint a compliance officer to
oversee the decree.

United States
v. Bayer AG11

Bayer proposed to acquire Monsanto.
Monsanto has a dominant position in the seed
market and Bayer has a dominant position in

Input foreclosure

Consent Decree required Bayer to
divest its canola, soybean, and
vegetable seed business and

9

Year

2017

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

the seed treatments market, which is a key
input for genetically modified seeds. The DOJ
alleged that the merger would give Bayer an
incentive to charge a higher price for seed
treatments to Monsanto’s rivals.

certain seed treatments. It must
also divest certain intellectual
property and research capabilities.

United States
v. AT&T Inc.12

AT&T proposed to acquire Time Warner for
Unilateral and
$85 billion. AT&T is the largest distributor of coordinated input
subscription television, through its subsidiary foreclosure
DirecTV. Time Warner owns several TV
networks such as TNT, TBS, CNN, and HBO.
The DOJ alleged that the merger would give
AT&T an incentive to coordinate with
Comcast to charge other distributors more to
provide Time Warner channels, because in the
event that bargaining failed some customers of
other distributors would switch to DirecTV.
The DOJ alleged that the market was
conducive to coordination because both
Comcast and AT&T-Time Warner want to
slow the growing popularity of multichannel
online video services.

Following a loss at trial, the court’s
final judgment approved the
merger without any restrictions.

In re
Broadcom
Ltd.13

Broadcom proposed to acquire Brocade
Communication Systems. Brocade
manufactures fibre switches. Brocade and
Cisco are the only two competitors in the
worldwide market for fibre switches.
Broadcom supplies both companies with
application specific integrated circuits to make
these switches. The FTC alleged that the

Consent Decree required
Broadcom to implement firewalls
preventing flow of Cisco’s
confidential information to
Brocade.

10

Misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

merger would give Broadcom the ability to
share Cisco’s confidential information with
Brocade to preempt Cisco’s competitive moves
and thus raise the prices for fibre channel
switches.

2016

United States
v. Danone
S.A.14

Danone proposed to acquire WhiteWave.
Danone is a leading manufacturer of organic
yogurt through its Stonyfield brand.
WhiteWave is a manufacturer of fluid organic
milk. Prior to this merger, Danone developed
a close relationship to CROPP, another
manufacturer of fluid organic milk, under
which CROPP provided Danone with 90% of
its fluid organic milk needs. CROPP also
licensed Danone’s Stonyfield brand to sell
fluid organic milk. The DOJ alleged that the
merger and the close relationship between
CROPP and Danone would give CROPP and
WhiteWave an incentive to coordinate and
exchange confidential information to raise the
price of fluid organic milk because CROPP
could not easily sever its Supply and License
Agreements with Danone.

Buy-side
coordination
through information
exchange

Consent Decree required Danone
to divest its Stonyfield brand to a
competitor approved by the
United States because this severed
the Supply and License
Agreements between Danone and
CROPP.

United States v.
Lam Research
Corp.15

Lam Research Corp. is a provider of “etch,
deposition, and clean” tools and process
technology used for the fabrication of
semiconductors. KLA-Tencor is a supplier of
metrology and inspection equipment for
semiconductors. KLA-Tencor’s technology is

Input foreclosure

Transaction abandoned.

11

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

used to review the semiconductor to ensure it
is not defective, while Lam’s technology helps
create the semiconductor. Lam proposed to
acquire KLA-Tencor for $10.6 billion. The
DOJ alleged that Lam’s control of KLA-Tenor
would allow Lam to foreclose its fabrication
competitors by reducing timely access to
KLA-Tencor inspection equipment and related
critical services for the production of
semiconductors.
United States v.
AnheuserBusch InBev
(SABMiller)16

Anheuser-Busch (ABI) proposed to acquire
SABMiller for $107 billion. ABI owns and
operates more than 40 major beer brands in
the United States; SABMiller, through
MillerCoors, owns and operates 12 breweries
in the United States, and also has more than
40 major beer brands. As a result of the
acquisition, ABI would gain a majority
interest in MillerCoors. The DOJ alleged that
the merger would increase ABI’s “incentive
and ability to disadvantage its remaining
rivals by limiting or impeding the distribution
of their beers[.]”

Input foreclosure

While the concern was primarily
horizontal (and the Consent decree
requires ABI to divest SABMiller’s
entire U.S. business, including
ownership interest in MillerCoors),
there was also a vertical element.
The Consent Decree) prohibits ABI
from “instituting and continuing
practices and programs that limit
the ability and incentives of
independent beer distributors to sell
and promote the beers of ABI’s
rivals.” These practices typically
include incentives for distributors
to sell exclusively or near
exclusively ABI beers.

United States
v. AMC
Entertainme nt

AMC Entertainment Holdings proposed to
acquire Carmike Cinemas. Both are significant
competitors in the exhibition of first-run

Customer
foreclosure; misuse
of competitors’

Consent decree required AMC to
divest from movie theaters in
overlapping local markets, and to

12

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Holdings Inc.

commercial movies in fifteen local markets in
the United States. AMC is also a founding
member of National CineMedia – a pre-show
services provider – while Carmike is one of
the largest investors in NCM’s competitor,
Screenvision. The DOJ alleged that the new
AMC would reduce Carmicke’s incentive to
purchase from Screenvision, “resulting in less
aggressive competition [between Screenvision
and NCM] to gain exhibitors and advertisers
at the expense of the other.”

sensitive
information

sell off most of its holdings,
relinquish all governance rights in
NCM, and transfer 24 theatres to
the Screenvision network. AMC is
also required to establish firewalls
to ensure that it does not obtain
NCM’s, Screenvision’s, or other
movie exhibitors’ sensitive
information.

In re Par
Petroleum
Corporation and
Mid Pac
Petroleum LLC

Par Petroleum Corporation (“Par”), a
Input foreclosure
diversified energy company that owned the
Kapolei refinery on Oahu and wholesale and
retail distribution assets in Hawaii, proposed
to acquire the Koko’oha subsidiary of Mid Pac
Petroleum LLC, a bulk supplier and
distributor of petroleum products in Hawaii.
The FTC alleged that the acquisition would
give Par an incentive to deny Koko’oha’s
petroleum storage space rights at the Barbers
Point Terminal to Par’s competitor, Aloha,
reducing Aloha’s ability to credibly threaten
to import refined petroleum.

Consent Decree required Par to
terminate its rights at the Barbers
Point Terminal, other than for a
limited number of tanker trucks.

Comcast Co.,
Time Warner
Cable Inc.19

Comcast, the largest video and wired
broadband internet-access provider in the
United States, proposed to acquire Time
Warner Cable, the fourth largest video and
third largest wired broadband internet-access

Transaction abandoned.

17

2015

18

13

Input and customer
foreclosure

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

provider in the United States, for
approximately $45.2 billion. The DOJ cited
concerns that the merger “would make
Comcast an unavoidable gatekeeper for
internet-based services [including those that
compete with Comcast and Time Warner
Cable services] that rely on a broadband
connect to reach consumers.” Comcast, having
obtained sole ownership of NBCUniversal in
2013, would also be incentivized to foreclose
internet and broadband access to NBC
competitors, as well as deny carriage of NBC
competitors.
2014

In re Nielsen
Holdings N.V. 20

Nielsen Holdings N.V., a leading global
media measurement and research company
that provided television, online, mobile, and
cross-platform measurement services,
proposed to acquire Arbitron Inc., a media
measurement and research company
specializing in radio data. The FTC alleged
that the merger eliminated potential
competition in the “future market” of hybrid,
cross-platform media data, because the two
companies were in the best position to
develop these new these new services.

Merging firms as
potential entrants;
merging firms as
entry facilitators

Consent Decree required Nielsen
(1) to divest Arbitron’s indevelopment cross-platform
audience measurement business;
and (2) to perpetually license
current and the next eight years of
data from Arbitron’s measurement
panel to the buyer.

2013

In re General
Electric Co.21

General Electric Co. (“GE”) proposed to
acquire the aviation business of Avio S.p.A.,
which designed and manufactured component
parts for aircraft engines, including parts used

Input foreclosure

Consent Decree incorporated
portions of the original contract
between Avio and Pratt &
Whitney regarding the agreement

14

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

in Pratt & Whitney’s engine for the Airbus
A320neo. Through a joint venture, GE
manufactured the only other competing engine
option for the A320neo. The FTC alleged that
GE could disrupt the design and certification of
the Avio-supplied parts for the Pratt &
Whitney engine to favor the competitive
position of GE’s own engine.
2012

United States v.
United
Technologies
Corp.22

UTC, which manufactured aircraft turbine
engines, proposed to acquire Goodrich
Corporation (“Goodrich”), which
manufactured electronic control systems
(“ECS”) for aircraft turbine engines through a
joint venture with Rolls-Royce, and held the
exclusive rights to supply components to that
joint venture. The DOJ alleged that the merger
would give UTC an incentive and ability to
withhold ECSs from or to increase the cost of
components for ECSs to Rolls-Royce, with
which UTC competed to supply aircraft
turbine engines. Additionally, the DOJ alleged
that UTC could gain access to competitively
sensitive information about Rolls-Royce’s
aircraft turbine engines through the
information necessary to manufacture ECSs
for those engines. Finally, the DOJ alleged
similar concerns with respect to competition in
small aircraft turbine engines, for which
Goodrich supplied UTC’s competitors with
ECSs. The DOJ also alleged horizontal
15

Remedy
to develop the engine components
and restricted GE from interfering
with the Avio team working on
the project.

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Final Judgment required UTC to
divest to Rolls-Royce all of
Goodrich’s shares in its ECS joint
venture, and to provide RollsRoyce an option to acquire
Goodrich assets related to the
aftermarket for the joint venture’s
ECS products. The Final
Judgment also required UTC to
provide various supply and
transition services agreements to
the acquirers of the assets being
divested.

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Input and Customer
foreclosure

Final Judgment required the JV (1)
to license its broadcast, cable, and
film content to OVDs on terms
comparable to those on which it
licensed to MVPDs and to those
the OVD received from a
competitor of the JV; (2) to
relinquish its voting rights in the
Hulu joint venture (an OVD); (3) to
not use certain restrictive license
terms with OVDs; (4) to not

theories of harm in other markets.

2011

United States v.
Comcast Corp.23

Comcast Corp., General Electric Co. (“GE”),
NBC, and Navy, LLC formed a joint venture
of broadcast and cable network assets.
Comcast, the largest cable provider, would
have majority control of the JV containing
NBC’s popular video programming. The DOJ
and FCC alleged the combined entity could
withhold or raise the price of NBC content to
Comcast’s rival multichannel video
programming distributors (“MPVDs”) or
online video programming distributors

16

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

(“OVDs”) to reduce their ability to compete
with Comcast, as Comcast had done in the
past with its RSN network. Additionally,
Comcast could refuse to carry competitor
channels of NBC to reduce their ability to
compete against NBC. The DOJ rejected
claims that the transaction would eliminate
double marginalization as not, or at least not
entirely, merger specific because the industry
had already successfully done so through
contracts with non-linear pricing.

unreasonably discriminate in the
transmission of lawful content
through its internet service,
including by exempting its own
services from data caps; and (5) to
supply MVPDs with the JV’s
programming content and submit to
binding arbitration over the license
terms.

United States v.
GrafTech
International Ltd

GrafTech International Ltd., a manufacturer of Collusive
graphite electrodes, proposed to acquire
information
Seadrift Coke L.P., a manufacturer of
exchanges
petroleum needle coke, a key input in the
graphite electrodes. The DOJ alleged it would
provide Seadrift with direct access to
competitors’ pricing and product information
through GrafTech’s supply agreements and
most–favored-nation provisions with
Seadrift’s competitors, particularly Conoco
Phillips Co., ultimately facilitating the
collusive exchange of information.

Final Judgment required the
combined entity (1) to amend its
supply agreement to competitor
Conoco to remove ongoing audit
rights, sharing of confidential
information, and MFN pricing; (2)
to not enter into similar terms with
Conoco for ten years; and (3) to
firewall personnel deciding
Seadrift’s pricing and production
from Conoco’s competitively
sensitive information.

United States v.
Google Inc.25

Google Inc. proposed to acquire ITA Software
Inc., the developer and licenser of QPX
software, which was used by airlines, travel
agents, and online travel intermediaries
(“OTIs”) to provide customized flight
searches. Google intended to offer an online

Final Judgment required Google
(1) to honor existing QPX licenses;
(2) to renew existing licenses
under similar terms and conditions;
(3) to offer licenses to other online
travel intermediaries on

24

17

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

travel search that would compete with OTIs,
many of which used QPX. The DOJ alleged
that Google could deny OTIs access to or raise
their price for QPX software. Additionally, the
DOJ alleged that Google could gain access to
competitively sensitive information from
OTIs, such as tuning parameters and plans for
new services.

2010

Remedy
reasonable, non-discriminatory
terms and submit to binding
arbitration over those terms; (4) to
devote substantially the same
amount of resources to R&D for
QPX as ITA did before the merger;
(5) to not use certain restrictive
terms in its agreements with
airlines and OTIs; and (6) to
firewall OTIs’ competitively
sensitive information from
personnel involved in Google’s
travel search service.

In re CocaCola Co.26

The Coca-Cola Co. (“Coke”) proposed to
acquire its largest bottler, Coca-Cola
Enterprises (“CCE”), and an exclusive license
to bottle and distribute all Dr. Pepper Snapple
Group (“Dr Pepper”) brands that CCE
formerly distributed. The FTC alleged that to
carry out distribution activities, Coke would
have access to Dr Pepper’s commercially
sensitive information and could misuse that
information to exclude competitors or to
facilitate collusion.

Misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information;
collusive
information
exchange

Consent Decree limited access to
Dr Pepper’s commercially
sensitive information to Coke
employees who perform
traditional bottler functions.

In re PepsiCo,
Inc.27

PepsiCo, Inc. proposed to acquire two of its
bottler/distributor companies and an exclusive
license from Dr. Pepper Snapple Group (“Dr.
Pepper”) to bottle, distribute and sell brands in
certain territories that these two companies

Misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information;
collusive

Consent Decree limited access to
Dr Pepper’s commercially
sensitive information to Pepsi
employees who perform

18

Year

Case

United States
v. Ticketmaster
Entm’t, Inc.28

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

formerly sold. The FTC alleged that to carry
out distribution activities, Pepsi would have
access to Dr Pepper’s commercially sensitive
information and could misuse that information
to exclude competitors or to facilitate
collusion.

information
exchange

traditional bottler functions.

Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., the largest
U.S. primary ticketing company, proposed to
merge with Live Nation, Inc., the largest
concert promoter in the U.S. and the owner of
multiple concert venues. Before the merger,
Live Nation had licensed primary-ticketing
technology from CTS Eventim AG (“CTS”)
and secured contracts with venues
representing 15% of major concert venue
capacity. The DOJ alleged a horizontal loss of
competition and potential competition for
primary ticketing services and vertical
theories that the merger would eliminate Live
Nation and Ticketmaster as facilitators of entry
into one another’s primary markets and that the
merger would allow Live Nation and
Ticketmaster to exclude competitors by
bundling primary ticketing services with access
to artists promoted by Live Nation. The DOJ
rejected claims that the merger would eliminate
double marginalization as not merger specific,
because the firms were already in the process
of becoming vertically integrated themselves.

Merging firms as
potential entrants;
merging firms as
entry facilitators;
complementary
product foreclosure

The DOJ required Ticketmaster
(1) to license its platform software
used to sell tickets to Anschutz
Entertainment Group, Inc.
(“AEG”) and give AEG the option
to acquire a copy of the source
code after four years; (2) to not
ticket AEG venues after four years
to incent AEG to take that option;
and (3) to divest its Paciolan “selfticketing” platform to ComcastSpectator, L.P.
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Vertical Theory of
Harm
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2008

In re Fresenius
Medical Care
AG & Co
KGaA29

Fresenius Medical Care Ag & Co. KGaA, a
provider of dialysis services and owner of
dialysis clinics, proposed to acquire an
exclusive sublicense from Daiichi Sankyo
Company to manufacture and supply Venofer,
an iron deficiency treatment for dialysis
patients, to independent outpatient dialysis
clinics in the U.S. The FTC alleged that
Fresenius could inflate its Medicare
reimbursements by increasing the prices it
charged in its own clinics. Revisions to
Medicare reimbursement regulations taking
effect in 2012 would eliminate this distortion.

Evasion of
regulation

Consent Decree required
Fresenius to report an intracompany transfer price below the
level set by the FTC, which was
derived from current market
prices, until the revised
regulations took effect.

2007

United States
v. Monsanto
Co.30

Monsanto Co., a leading provider of incottonseed traits, proposed to acquire Delta and
Pine Land Co. (“DPL”), a large supplier of
“traited cottonseed” that worked with biotech
companies to develop cotton seed traits.
Monsanto and DPL originally partnered to
develop the most commonly used “traited
cottonseed,” with Monsanto developing the
traits and DPL manufacturing the seeds and
paying a license fee to Monsanto. Before the
merger, DPL had begun an effort to replace
Monsanto traits in DPL cottonseed with similar
traits developed by competitors of Monsanto.
Monsanto had in turn begun an effort to
manufacture cottenseeds by acquiring
Stoneville Pedigree Seed Company
(“Stoneville”), a competitor of DPL. The DOJ

Merging firms as
entry facilitators;
customer
foreclosure

Final Judgment required the
merged entity to divest certain
promising cottonseed
development lines, trait
technology, and forty DPL
cottonseed breeding lines, and to
modify Monsanto’s seed company
licenses.
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Consent Decree required (1) the
JV to cooperate on equal terms
with all providers of government
space vehicles; (2) Boeing and
Lockheed to equally consider the
JV’s launch service competitors in
government delivery in orbit
procurement; and (3) the JV,
Boeing, and Lockheed to establish
firewalls to prevent access to one
another’s or third firms’
confidential information.

challenged the merger, alleging a horizontal
loss of competition between DPL and
Stoneville and a vertical theory that DPL
would refuse to partner with other developers
of cottonseed traits that would compete
against Monsanto’s traits.
In re Lockheed
Martin Corp.31

Boeing Corp., a global aerospace company
and supplier to the Department of Defense,
and Lockheed Martin Corp., the largest
defense contractor in the U.S., were
competing providers of medium-to-heavy
(“MTH”) launch services and of space
vehicles. They proposed to form a joint
venture to consolidate their government
launch-service and space- vehicle businesses.
The FTC alleged that the JV could refuse to
provide launch services to competing space
vehicle providers, in particular for packaged
price procurement of the two services known
as “delivery in orbit.” Additionally, the FTC
alleged that the companies might share
confidential information obtained through
launch vehicle services with their respective
space vehicle businesses, and vice-versa. The
FTC also alleged that the transaction would
lead to a horizontal loss of competition
between the merging firms’ MTH launch
services and space vehicles, but accepted the
Department of Defense’s finding that the
increased launch reliability would outweigh
21
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Complementary
products foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive information

Final Judgment required Northrop
(1) to select payloads on a nondiscriminatory basis when it had
already been selected as the prime
contractor; and (2) to offer its
payloads to all competing prime
contractors on a nondiscriminatory basis when it was
competing to be the prime
contractor.

these effects.
2003

United States v.
Northrop
Grumman
Corp.32

Northrop Grumman Corp., one of two
suppliers of certain payloads for
reconnaissance satellite programs, proposed to
acquire TRW, Inc., a company with the ability
to act as a prime contractor on reconnaissance
satellite programs that use these products. The
DOJ alleged the company could deny
competitors access to its prime contractor or
payload capabilities. Additionally, it would
provide the entity access to proprietary
information of rival prime and payload
suppliers contracting with Northrop.

2002

In re Cytyc
Corp.33

Cytyc Corp., a manufacturer of liquid-based
Input foreclosure;
pap smear tests for cervical cancer, proposed to merging firms as
acquire Digene Corp., the only seller of a
potential entrants
DNA-based test for human papillomavirus
(“HPV”). Doctors conducted HPV tests from
the sample obtained by the liquid-based pap
smear. The FTC alleged that Cytyc could
foreclose its pap smear competitors by limiting
access to Digene’s HPV test. The FTC also
alleged that the merger would eliminate
Digene’s incentive to continue pursuing FDA
approval for its HPV test to be used as a
primary cervical cancer screen in place of
liquid-based pap smears.

22

Transaction abandoned.

Year
2001

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

United States
v. Premdor
Inc.34

Premdor Inc., the largest global manufacturer
of interior molded doors and a small producer
of molded door skins, proposed to acquire
Masonite Corp., a manufacturer of molded
door skins and fiberboard, the primary input
for molded door skins. Premdor had recently
entered the production of molded door skins
and, although it was relatively small, had used
its potential to expand to negotiate discounts
from Masonite. The DOJ alleged a horizontal
loss of competition in the sale of molded door
skins and vertical theories that the elimination
of the threat of Premdor’s expansion in molded
door skins allowed enhanced coordination
upstream and downstream and that the merger
would lead to lower costs and greater cost
symmetry between the merged firm and
another vertically integrated firm, making
collusion more likely.

Merging firms as
potential entrants;
elimination of
disruptive buyer;
collusive
information
exchange; using
lower costs to
facilitate consensus
or to increase the
ability to punish
defectors

Final Judgment required Premdor
to divest its Towanda facility,
which engaged in the production
of molded door skins, creating a
new upstream competitor.

In re Entergy
Corporation
and EntergyKoch, LP 35

Entergy Corporation, a generator, transmitter,
and distributor of electricity, proposed to form
a joint venture with Entergy- Koch, LP with
Koch Industries, Inc., which owned an
electricity derivatives trading company and the
Gulf South pipeline. The JV would combine
Entergy’s subsidiary that markets electricity
and gas with Koch Industries’ electricity
derivatives trading company and the Gulf
South pipeline. The FTC alleged that, as a
result of Entergy’s exclusive legal right to sell

Evasion of
regulation

Consent Decree required Entergy
to establish a competitive bidding
process for its sourcing of gas
transportation services.
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

electricity in Louisiana and Mississippi and
recover 100% of the costs from those states’
electricity producers and the
acquisition, Entergy would have the incentive
to purchase gas transportation services from
the Gulf South pipeline at an inflated price.
2000

In re Ceridian
Corp.36

Ceridian Corp., a provider of fleet-card
services to over-the- road trucking companies,
acquired Trendar Corp, a provider of fuel
purchase desk automation systems used to
process fleet card transactions. The FTC
alleged that Ceridian could deny rival fleetcard services access to Trendar’s system or
grant access to them only on discriminatory
terms. The FTC also alleged that Ceridian
could deny rival fuel purchase desk
automation systems the ability to process
Ceridian cards. (The FTC learned of the nonreportable acquisition of Trendar during
Ceridian’s 1998 acquisition of a competing
provider of fleet card services, which the FTC
also challenged.)

Merging firms as
entry facilitators;
input foreclosure;
customer foreclosure

Consent Order required Ceridian
(1) to provide ten-year licenses to
Trendar fuel purchase desk
automation systems to rival fleetcard providers; (2) to pay for a
third-party software developer of
the Commission’s choice to
implement interoperability
between Trendar’s system and
rival fleet-card providers’
networks; and (3) to provide tenyear licenses to rival fuel
purchaser desk automation system
suppliers to process Ceridian’s
fleet cards on the same terms as
Trendar systems were able to
process Ceridian fleet cards.

In re America
Online, Inc.37

America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), a global
narrowband and broadband internet service
provider (“ISP”), proposed to merge with
Time Warner Inc., a cable television
distributor and broadband ISP. Before the

Input foreclosure;
customer
foreclosure

Consent Decree required the
merged firm (1) to not make AOL
broadband available in a cable
service area until Earthlink, a
competitor, was able to offer cable
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Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

merger, AOL had recently launched AOL TV,
a first-generation interactive television
(“ITV”) service delivered through local cable
providers. The FTC alleged a horizontal loss
of competition between AOL and Time
Warner in broadband internet access and
vertical theories that the combined firm would
have the ability and incentive to block or deter
rival ITV providers from competing with AOL
TV through its cable system. Additionally, the
FTC was concerned that the merged entity
would foreclose competing ISPs from
providing cable broadband ISP service on
Time Warner’s cable system.
In re Boeing
Company 38

Boeing Company, a supplier of launch
vehicles and a contractor bidding for a certain
classified Department of Defense classified
program, proposed to acquire certain spacerelated assets of General Motors Corporation,
including satellite production and a systems
engineering and technical assistance
(“SETA”) for a certain classified Department
of Defense program. The FTC alleged that
Boeing would (1) use its position as the SETA
contractor for the classified program to favor
its own bid or to obtain competitively
sensitive information about competitors’ bids;
(2) access rival satellite producers’
competitively sensitive information through
its launch vehicle business; (3) access rival
25

Remedy
internet service in that area; (2) to
enter agreements to carry two
other non-affiliated cable ISPs in
that area within 90 days of
offering AOL broadband service;
(3) to not interfere the ability of a
subscriber to access competing
ITV services; and (4) to charge a
comparable price for AOL DSL
service in Time Warner Service
areas as outside those areas.

Customer
foreclosure;
complement ary
products
foreclosure; misuse
of competitors’
sensitive
information

Consent Decree required Boeing
(1) to firewall competitively
sensitive information of rival
bidders it received in its capacity
as a SETA contractor; (2) to
provider certain documentation
and transition services to the
Department of Defense to enable
it to transition SETA for the
program away from Boeing; (3) to
firewall competitively sensitive
information of satellite rivals’
obtained through Boeing’s launch
services; and (4) to provide certain
interface information for its
satellites to rival launch services

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

launch vehicle providers’ competitively
sensitive information through its satellite
business; and (4) withhold satellite interface
information necessary to use Boeing’s
satellites with competing launch vehicles.

1999

Remedy
providers.

United States v.
Enova Corp.39

Enova Corp., an electric utility provider in
San Diego, and Pacific Enterprises, a major
provider of natural gas transportation services
to gas-fired plants and of natural gas storage
in California, proposed to merge. The DOJ
alleged that the Pacific would have the ability
and incentive following the merger to deny
access to or raise the price of its natural gas
transportation services for rival electricity
producers. California regulations establishing
marginal-unit pricing for all electricity would
magnify this effect.

Input foreclosure

In re Barnes &
Noble, Inc. and
Ingram Book
Group 40

Barnes and Noble, Inc. (“B&N”), a book
retailer, proposed to merge with Ingram Book
Group, a book wholesaler. Before the
transaction, B&N had announced publicly that
it considered providing wholesale services to
retailers. The FTC alleged a horizontal loss of
potential competition in book wholesaling and
vertical theory that B&N could restrict access
or raise prices of books to competing retailers.
The FTC also alleged that B&N would could
gain access to rivals’ competitively sensitive
information through Ingram which could allow

Input foreclosure;
Transaction abandoned.
elimination of
potential competition;
misuse of
competitors’ sensitive
information

26

Final Judgment required the
merged firm to divest all low-cost
gas generators that would likely
provide the firm with the incentive
to raise electricity prices. It
allowed Enova to keep higher-cost
generators because these would be
active insufficiently frequently for
a downstream increase in price to
outweigh an upstream loss of
sales.

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

it to preempt rivals’ competitive efforts.
In re Provident
Companies 41

Provident Companies, Inc. and UNUM
Corporation, both providers of insurance for
individual disability policies, proposed to
merge. It was common practice in the industry
for insurers to supply one another with
actuarial data through an industry association
to assist in determining the risk of individuals
for particular injuries. The FTC alleged that
the combined firm would no longer have the
incentive to provide this data to rivals, as it
would have sufficient scale that the
competitive harm to rivals would outweigh
the reduction in its own ability to assess its
insureds’ risk.

Input foreclosure

Consent Decree required the
merged firm to provide its actuarial
data to rivals through an industry
association for 20 years.

In re Merck &
Co, Inc. 42

Merck & Co., a pharmaceutical manufacturer,
acquired Medco Manage Care, L.L.C. in
1993, a provider of pharmacy benefit
management (“PBM”) services. The FTC
alleged that Merck could (1) foreclose rival
pharmaceutical manufacturers from Medco’s
drug formulary; (2) Merck would have access
to competitors’ proprietary information
through the PBM services; and (3) Medco
would be eliminated as an independent,
disruptive negotiator with pharmaceutical
companies.

Customer
foreclosure; misuse
of competitors’
sensitive
information;
collusive
information
exchange;
elimination of a
disruptive buyer.

Consent Decree required Merck:
(1) to establish an independent
Pharmacy and Therapeutics
committee to determine which
drugs would qualify for an “open
formulary” it was required to
maintain; (2) to accept all
discounts offered by other drug
manufacturers on the open
formulary and reflect those
discounts in their products’
ranking on the open formulary;
and (3) to firewall from Merck
and Medco the competitively
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Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy
sensitive information of the
other’s rivals.

In re CMS
Energy
Corporation 43

CMS Energy Corporation (“CMS”), which
owned a combination electric and gas utility
serving broad sections of Michigan, proposed
to acquire the Panhandle Eastern and Trunkline
pipelines from Duke Energy. Before the
merger, CMS had natural gas interconnections
with other rival pipelines. The FTC alleged that
CMS would have an incentive to close its
interconnection or reduce its interconnection
capacity available to other pipelines, increasing
demand on the Panhandle Eastern and
Trunkline pipelines and enabling them to raise
their rates.

Input foreclosure

Consent Decree required CMS (1)
to maintain a designated level of
interconnection capacity based on
historical usage levels; and (2)
offer shippers the ability to break
contracts and interconnect with
another pipeline or to tap CMS’s
own account to supply gas if the
available interconnection capacity
is less than actual capacity.

United States
v. SBC
Comm’ns Inc.44

SBC Communications, Inc. (“SBC”), a
provider of local exchange, long distance, and
wireless mobile telephone services, proposed
to acquire Ameritech Corporation, a provider
of wireless mobile telephone services. Before
the merger, Ameritech had planned to enter the
provision of local exchange and long distance
services in a bundle with Ameritech’s wireless
service in St. Louis. The DOJ alleged that, as a
result of the acquisition, Ameritech would no
longer have the incentive to offer a bundle of
Ameritech’s wireless services with the local
exchange and long-distance services in
competition with SBC. The DOJ also alleged a

Merging firms as
potential entrants;
complementary
product foreclosure

Final Judgment required SBC to
divest its cellular business and all
assets involved in its planned
entry into St. Louis, as well as
assets to eliminate the horizontal
overlaps.
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Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Dominion Resources, Inc., an electricity
provider, proposed to acquire Consolidated
Natural Gas Co., a distributor of natural gas,
one of the fuels used to generate electricity.
The FTC alleged that Dominion could use its
control over the available source of natural gas
and transportation capacity in the area to limit
or deter independent producers from
generating electricity.

Merging firms as
entry facilitators;
input foreclosure

Consent Decree required the
divestiture of Consolidated
subsidiary, Virginia Natural Gas,
Inc., which provided gas
distribution services.

United States v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. and Northrop
Lockheed Martin Grumman Corp., both integrated defense
Corp. 46
contractors, proposed to merge. The DOJ
alleged that the acquisition would give
Lockheed control over all of Northrop’s
military platforms, prime contracts, and
capabilities in critical systems and subsystems,
providing it with the incentive to refuse to sell,
sell inferior quality, or sell on unfavorable
terms these systems to its integrated
electronics system competitors, and that
Northrop’s systems engineering and technical
assistance services contracts would give
Lockheed access to competitors’ sensitive
information. The DOJ also alleged horizontal
theories of harm in other markets.

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Transaction abandoned.

horizontal loss of competition in markets
where both SBC and Ameritech provided
wireless service.
In re Dominion
Resources,
Inc.45

1998
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Vertical Theory of
Harm
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In re
PacificCorp 47

PacifiCorp, a provider of retail electricity in
seven states and of wholesale electricity in
others, proposed to acquire The Energy Group
PLC (“TEG”), which owned Peabody Coal
Company, a coal-mine operator. TEG supplied
coal to the Navajo and Mojave Generating
Stations, which competed with PacifiCorp’s
generating assets in the Western Systems
Coordinating Council, an electricity pool. The
FTC alleged that PacifiCorp would have an
incentive (1) to manipulate the costs of its coal
to affect the contract prices to Navajo and
Mojave Generating Stations and refrain from
offering them discounts if the coal price were
to fall or if its mines were to have excess
capacity; and (2) to access competitively
sensitive information about the costs of
competitors using its coal.

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Consent Decree required
PacifiCorp to divest Peabody
Western Coal Company, the
subsidiary owning the mines that
supplied competitors. The
transaction was abandoned for
unrelated reasons.

United States v.
Primestar, Inc. 48

Primestar, Inc., an investment entity controlled
by five cable companies, proposed to acquire
the satellite assets of MCI Communications
Corp., The News Corporation Limited, and K.
Rupert Murdoch, which included the only
orbital slot from which direct-broadcast
service (“DBS”) video programming could be
offered. The DOJ alleged that the acquisition
would allow the cable companies to deny the
orbital slot to their DBS competitors,
preserving their cable monopolies.

Input foreclosure

Transaction abandoned.
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Vertical Theory of
Harm
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In re TRW
Inc.49

TRW Inc. and BDM International Inc.
proposed to merge. TRW was part of a joint
venture competing for the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization’s Lead Systems
Integrator (“LSI”) contract while BDM was
the sole supplier of systems engineering and
technical assistance (“SETA”) services for the
program. The FTC alleged that the acquisition
would enable TRW to access its competitors’
competitively sensitive bidding information
and that TRW’s SETA role would allow it to
favor its own bids through the setting of
procurement rules and evaluation of bids.

Customer
foreclosure; misuse
of competitors’
sensitive
information

Consent Decree required TRW to
divest BDM’s contract with the
Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization for SETA services
and all related assets.

In re Shell Oil
Co. 50

Shell Oil Co. and Texaco, Inc. proposed to
form a joint

Input foreclosure

Consent Decree required the JV to
enter into a ten-year supply
agreement with Shell’s competitor
for crude and to divest assets to
remedy the horizontal overlaps.

Input foreclosure

Consent Decree required Cadence
to allow developers competing

venture combining their various gasoline, fuel,
and pipeline assets. Shell and another company
made the majority of asphalt used in Northern
California, and both bought the undiluted
heavy crude used to make the asphalt from
Texaco’s pipeline. The FTC alleged that the
JV could raise the cost of crude for Shell’s
competitor, leading to an increase in the price
for asphalt. The FTC also alleged numerous
horizontal theories of harm in other markets.
1997

In re Cadence
Design Systems,

Cadence Design Systems, Inc. (“Cadence”), a
leading supplier of integrated circuit layout
31

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Inc. 51

environments, proposed to acquire Cooper &
Chryan Technology, Inc. (“CCT”), a supplier
of integrated circuit routing tools. The FTC
alleged that the merger would reduce
Cadence’s incentives to permit competing
suppliers of routing tools to access its layout
environments on the same terms as it allowed
developers of tools which did not compete
with CCT’s.

In re Time
Warner, Inc. 52

Time Warner, Inc. (“TW”), a leading provider
of cable program networks and cable multivideo program distributor (“MVPD”),
proposed to acquire Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. (“Turner”), which owned several
popular cable networks. The FTC alleged that
TW would refuse to carry competitors of
Turner’s CNN Network, such as Fox News or
MSNBC, and would raise the price of TW and
Turner cable programming to rival MVPDs.

Input foreclosure;
customer
foreclosure

Consent Decree required TW (1) to
not bundle its own programming
with Turner programming; (2) to
offer Turner programming to rival
MVPDs at its pre-merger price;
and (3) to carry at least one rival
network to CNN on TW’s cable
systems.

In re Boeing
Company 53

Boeing Company, a manufacturer of highaltitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicles,
proposed to acquire the Aerospace and
Defense Business of Rockwell International
Corporation, which provided wing
components to a rival manufacturer of highaltitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicles.
The FTC alleged that the acquisition would
allow Boeing (1) to deny access to or degrade
the quality of the wings provided to the rival

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Consent Decree required Boeing
(1) to offer the rival manufacturer
of high- altitude endurance
unmanned aerial vehicles the
ability to change to a different
supplier of wing components and
deliver the assets necessary to do
so; and (2) to firewall the
competitively sensitive information
of the rival manufacturer of high-

32

Remedy
with CCT to participate in its
software interface programs on the
same terms as developers whose
tools did not compete with CCT’s.

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

manufacturer of high-altitude endurance
unmanned aerial vehicles; and (2) to access
competitively sensitive information about the
rival manufacturer of high-altitude endurance
unmanned aerial vehicles.
1996

In re Lockheed
Martin
Corporation 54

Lockheed Martin Corporation, one of the
largest defense and space contractors in the
U.S., proposed to acquire Loral Corporation,
another defense and space contractor. The
proposed acquisition affected several markets.
Loral Corporation was the FAA’s systems
engineering and technical services (“SETA”)
contractor, a position in which it developed
procurement specifications for the agency and
assessed bids. Lockheed participated in many
of the procurement auctions for which Loral
was the SETA contractor. The FTC alleged
that the acquisition would give Lockheed
access to competitively sensitive information
about competing bidders, as well as allow
Lockheed to tailor procurement specifications
or skew bid evaluations to raise its rivals’
costs.
Loral was a supplier of critical components for
tactical fighter aircraft. Lockheed was a
manufacturer of tactical fighter aircraft. The
FTC alleged that the acquisition would give
Lockheed access to competitively sensitive
33

Remedy
altitude endurance unmanned
aerial vehicles obtained through
supply of wing components.

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information;
collusive
information
exchange

Consent Decree required Lockheed
Martin (1) to divest Loral’s SETA
contract; (2) to firewall
competitively sensitive information
about tactical fighter
manufacturers using Loral
components; (3) to firewall
competitively sensitive information
about unmanned aerial vehicle
manufacturers using Loral
integrated communications
systems; (4) to limit its ownership
interest in Loral Space to 20%; (5)
to not provide any personnel,
information, or facilities to Loral
Space under the technical services
agreement; and (6) to not share
board members or officers with
Loral Space and not compensate
any Lockheed Martin officer or
board member based on the profits
of Loral Space.

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

Remedy

Input foreclosure

Final Judgment required Thomson
to divest the electronic citator it
provided to Lexis and to extend
terms of existing database licenses
to Lexis and to divest assets to

information about its competitors who used
Loral’s components.
Loral was a supplier of integrated
communications systems for unmanned aerial
vehicles. Lockheed was a manufacturer of
unmanned aerial vehicles. The FTC alleged
that the acquisition would give Lockheed
access to competitively sensitive information
about its competitors who used Loral’s
integrated communications’ systems.
As part of the acquisition, Loral’s space and
telecommunications business would be
transferred to a new entity (Loral Space) in
which Lockheed Martin would obtain a 20%
convertible preferred equity interest, and under
which Lockheed Martin would provide
technical services including R&D to Loral
Space. The FTC also alleged a horizontal loss
of competition between Lockheed Martin and
Loral Space in commercial low-Earth orbit and
geosynchronous orbit satellites, both from
enhanced coordination and unilateral effects
from the partial ownership interest.
United States
v. The
Thomson Corp.
55

Thomson Corp., the world’s largest publisher
of information for professional markets,
proposed to acquire West Publishing Co., the
largest publisher of legal research materials in
the U.S. Thomson licensed primary and
34
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Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

secondary law materials as well as additional
services (such as an electronic citator) to
West’s primary competitor in comprehensive
online legal research services, Lexis-Nexis.
The DOJ alleged that the acquisition would
increase Thomson’s incentive and ability to
increase the prices of, reduce the quality of, or
refuse access to Thomson materials it
provides to Lexis-Nexis. The DOJ also
alleged horizontal theories of harm in certain
enhanced primary law products and secondary
law materials.

Remedy
remedy the horizontal overlaps.

In re Raytheon
Company 56

Raytheon Company, a prime contractor
bidding for the U.S. Navy’s Submarine High
Data Rate Satellite Communications Terminal,
proposed to acquire Chrysler Technologies
Holding, Inc. (“CTH”), a provider of antenna
and terminal controls that were an input into
Submarine High Data Rate Satellite
Communications Terminals. Before the
merger, CTH had joined the bidding team for
GTE Corporation, a prime contractor
competing with Raytheon. The FTC alleged
that the acquisition would allow Raytheon and
GTE to use CTH as a vehicle to exchange
competitively sensitive information.

Collusive
information
exchange

Consent Decree required
Raytheon to firewall Raytheon’s
and GTE’s competitively sensitive
information from being exchanged
through CTH.

In re Hughes
Danbury Optical

Hughes Danbury Optical Systems (“HDOS”),
a producer of adaptive optics systems,
proposed to acquire Itek Optical Systems

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’

Consent Decree required HDOS
(1) to not enforce the exclusivity
provisions with Xinetics Inc. for
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Systems, Inc.57

Division of Litton Industries, Inc., a producer
of deformable mirrors. There were two teams
developing the adaptive optics system, which
required deformable mirrors, for the U.S. Air
Force’s Airborne Laser (“ABL”) program;
HDOS was part of the “Rockwell team” while
Itek was part of the “Boeing team.” Xinetics
Inc., another producer of deformable mirrors,
had an exclusive contract with HDOS. The
FTC alleged that HDOS could (1) foreclose
the Boeing team from access to Itek or
Xinetics deformable mirrors; and (2) gain
access to competitively sensitive information
of the Boeing team through Itek.

sensitive
information

the ABL program; and (2) to
firewall competitively sensitive
information Itek received as a
member of the Boeing team.

In re Silicon
Graphics,
Inc.58

Silicon Graphics, Inc. (“SGI”), a supplier of
entertainment graphics workstations, proposed
to acquire Alias Research Inc. (“Alias”). and
Wavefront Technology Inc. (“Wavefront”),
two developers of entertainment graphics
software. The FTC alleged that the new entity
could foreclose rival workstation producers
from accessing critical entertainment graphics
software and could foreclose competing
entertainment graphics companies from
developing software compatible with SGI’s
workstations. Additionally, Silicon could
access competitively sensitive information
related to other workstation producers through
their use of Alias or Wavefront entertainment

Complemen tary
products foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive information

Consent Decree required SGI (1)
to enter an agreement with a rival
workstation provider to port
Alias’s and Wavefront’s
entertainment graphics software to
the rivals’ systems; (2) to maintain
an open architecture for SGI
systems and publish SGI systems’
application programming
interfaces; and (3) to maintain a
software development program for
rivals of Alias and Wavefront with
similar terms to those used for
other development programs.
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Vertical Theory of
Harm
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graphics software.
In re Alliant
Techsystems
Inc.59

Alliant Techsystems Inc. (“Alliant”), a
manufacturer of ammunition and munitions,
proposed to acquire Hercules Incorporated’s
aerospace division, a supplier of propellant
used in large caliber ammunition. The FTC
alleged that Alliant would gain access to
competitors’ confidential information
regarding munitions through its role as a
supplier of propellant.

Misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information;
collusive
information
exchange

Consent Decree required Alliant
to firewall competitively sensitive
information gained through
Alliant’s capacity as a propellant
provider.

United States
v. Sprint
Corp.60

Sprint Corp., France Telecom (“FT”), and
Deutsche Telekom (“DT”) proposed to form a
joint venture for international
telecommunication services. Additionally, FT
and DT agreed to acquire 20% of voting
equity in Sprint. The DOJ alleged that the JV
could: (1) restrict competitors from accessing
French and German public switched networks,
infrastructure, and public data networks
controlled by FT and DT; (2) deny operating
agreements for a correspondent system in
France and Germany to competitors of the JV,
which were necessary for telecommunications
traffic; and (3) obtain confidential information
from other U.S. carriers through the Sprint
ownership and JV participation.

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information;
collusive
information
exchange

Final Judgment required (1) FT
and DT to make services available
to competitors of the JV on a nondiscriminatory basis; (2) Sprint to
forego providing correspondent
telecommunication services with
France or Germany unless another
provider has an operating
agreement; (3) Sprint to disclose
certain information about its
agreements with DT and FT; and
(4) FT and DT to firewall Sprint
and the JV from competitively
sensitive information of Sprint’s
rivals. The Final Judgment also
imposed certain additional
restrictions until facilities-based
competition with FT and DT were
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legalized in their home countries.

In re Eli Lilly
& Co., Inc. 61

Eli Lilly and Co., a manufacturer of
pharmaceuticals, proposed to acquire
McKesson, Inc., which through its PCS
Health Systems, Inc. (“PCS”) subsidiary
provided pharmacy benefit management
(“PBM”) services. As part of its PBM
services, PCS maintained a drug formulary,
which included several of Eli’s Lilly’s drugs.
The FTC alleged that (1) competing
manufacturer’s drugs would likely be
foreclosed from the PCS formulary; (2) Eli
Lilly would have access to competitors’
proprietary information through the PBM
services; and (3) PCS would be eliminated as
an independent negotiator of pharmaceutical
prices.

Customer
foreclosure; misuse
of competitors’
sensitive
information;
collusive
information
exchange;
elimination of
disruptive buyer.

Consent Decree required Eli Lilly
(1) to maintain an open formulary
implemented by an independent
committee and to reflect all
discounts and rebates offered by
other drug manufacturers on the
open formulary; (2) to firewall
Lilly’s competitively sensitive
information from being released to
Lilly competitors through PCS;
(3) to firewall PCS’s confidential
information from being released to
PCS competitors through Lilly.

In re Lockheed
Corp. and
Martin
Marietta
Corp.62

Lockheed Corp., a manufacturer of military
aircraft, and Martin Marietta Corp., a supplier
of an infrared navigation and targeting system
(“LANTIRN”) for military aircraft, proposed
to merge. The FTC alleged that (1) the
company could modify Martin Marietta’s
LANTIRN systems to raise the costs of
competing military aircraft; and (2) Lockheed’s
military aircraft division could access rival
military aircraft manufacturers’ sensitive
information shared with Martin Marietta to use
its LANTIRN system. The FTC also alleged

Input foreclosure;
misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Consent Decree required the
merged firm (1) to not modify the
LANTIRN system in a way that
discriminated against rival aircraft
manufacturers unless necessary;
(2) to firewall competitively
sensitive information from military
aircraft competitors obtained by
Martin Marietta as part of their use
of the LANTIRN system; and (3)
to refrain from enforcing certain
teaming agreements to remove the
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horizontal losses of competition in the
development of expendable launch vehicles,
in satellites for use in space- based early
warning systems, and in certain sensors.
1994

Remedy
horizontal overlaps.

In re Martin
Marietta
Corp63

Martin Marietta Corp., a manufacturer of
satellites, proposed to acquire General
Dynamics Corp.’s Space Systems Division,
which produced expendable launch vehicles.
The FTC alleged that Martin Marietta could
access confidential information of competing
satellite suppliers through its role as a provider
of expendable launch vehicles.

Misuse of
competitors’
sensitive
information

Consent Decree required Martin
Marietta to firewall competitively
sensitive information of rival
satellite producers obtained in its
role as a provider of expendable
launch vehicles.

United States
v. AT&T 64

AT&T Corp., the largest U.S. long distance
telephone company and a provider of cellular
infrastructure equipment, proposed to acquire
McCaw Cellular Communications, the largest
cellular carrier. The DOJ alleged that (1)
AT&T would limit access to or raise the price
of its cellular infrastructure equipment to
networks competing with McCaw’s; (2)
McCaw could gain access to its competitors’
competitively sensitive information through
their use of AT&T equipment; (3) AT&T
could gain access to its competitors’
competitively sensitive information through
McCaw’s use of their equipment; and (4)
McCaw could steer its customers to using
AT&T’s interexchange services, eliminating
competition between AT&T and rival

Input foreclosure;
customer
foreclosure; misuse
of competitors’
sensitive
information

Final Judgment required AT&T
(1) to provide equal access to
interexchange competitors of
AT&T; (2) to firewall
competitively sensitive
information McCaw obtained
from competing cellular
infrastructure equipment
providers; (3) to firewall
competitively sensitive
information AT&T obtain from
competing cellular carriers; and
(4) to continue to deal with
cellular infrastructure equipment
customers on current terms and on
terms equal to those provided to

39

Year

Case

Description

Vertical Theory of
Harm

interexchange service providers.

McCaw.

United States
v. MCI
Commc’ns
Corp. 65

British Telecommunications plc. (“BT”)
proposed to acquire 20% interest in MCI
Communications Corp. and to form a joint
venture for global telecommunication
services. Global telecommunications services
were provided on a “correspondent” basis, in
which providers completed each other’s
traffic. The DOJ alleged that: (1) BT could
use pricing or contract terms to favor MCI for
international correspondence services; (2) MCI
could gain access to competitors’ competitively
sensitive information through their
relationships with BT; and (3) BT could send
all or most of its international switch traffic to
MCI.

United States
v. TeleCommc’ns Inc.

Tele-Communications, Inc. (“TCI”) and
Input foreclosure;
Liberty Media Corp. (“Liberty”), both large
customer
cable multichannel subscription television
foreclosure
distributors (“MSTDs”) that had interests in
video programming networks, proposed to
merge. Before the merger, the firms had
substantial cross-ownership and cooperated
closely. The DOJ alleged that, although their
cross-ownership and differing service areas had
already eliminated horizontal competition, the
merger would (1) give each company the
incentive to deny or make more expensive to
rival video programming networks carriage on

66

40
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Input foreclosure;
customer
foreclosure; misuse
of competitors’
sensitive
information;
collusive
information
exchange

Final Judgment required BT (1) to
follow transparency and
disclosure requirements for
telecommunication services
between BT and MCI; and (2) to
firewall competitively sensitive
information from MCI’s
competitors obtained through
BT’s correspondent services.

Final Judgment required the
merged firm (1) to not
discriminate in providing carriage
on its cable systems to rival video
programming networks, where the
effect would be to unreasonably
restrain competition; and (2) to
not discriminate in providing its
video programming services to
rival MSTDs, where the effect
would be to unreasonably restrain
competition.

Year
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their cable systems; and (2) give each company
the incentive to deny or make more expensive
to rival MSTDs the programming from their
video programming networks.
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